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An examination of bankruptcy cases
decided from 1990 to 1993.
By Bruce A. Markell*
During the 1980s, bankruptcy cases accounted for approximately one percent of the Supreme
Court's docket, or an average of one or two cases a year. In the three terms beginning with the October term of
1990, however, the Court accepted an average of six bankruptcy cases per year, boosting its average annual per-
centage of bankruptcy fare to approximately five percent.
1
Why? In this article, I will examine
the eighteen cases decided from 1991
through 1993, to determine if there is
a consistent thread linking them.2 Al-
though such synthesis is what articles
like this are about, I warn the reader
early: I have no definitive answers. At
best I can provide only working
hypotheses for future writers. And it is
to that task that I now turn.
October Term 1990
he first term, 1990-91, pro-
duced six bankruptcy-relat-
ed decisions. The first two,
Langenkamp v. Culp and Grogan v. Gar-
ner, stand for simple propositions.
Langenkamp holds that a creditor loses
whatever fight to jury trial it has with
respect to preference actions if it files
a proof of claim. Grogan deals with dis-
chargeability issues; it holds that
collateral estoppel (issue preclusion)
applies in fraud dischargeability cases,
and that the quantum of proof in
such cases is a preponderance of the
evidence. Although both decisions
can be reduced to simple holdings,
each has broad implications for other
similar cases.
Langenkamp's facts were straightfor-
ward. Consumers invested funds with
the debtors, who were uninsured,
non-bank financial companies. The
debtors, in turn, issued "passbook sav-
ings certificates," representing the
debtors' obligation to repay money in-
vested. Within ninety days prior to
their bankruptcy filing, the debtors
paid some, but not all, of the funds
owed to the consumers. After the
debtors' bankruptcy filing, the con-
sumers filed proofs of claim with re-
spect to the unpaid amounts. The
trustee responded with a suit to recov-
er the amounts paid as preferences.
After a bench trial, the trustee pre-
vailed. The district court affirmed, but
the Tenth Circuit reversed. It believed
that the consumers had a jury trial
right on the preference issues. The
Supreme Court reversed the Tenth
Circuit in an 8-0 per curiam opinion,
holding that the consumers were not
entitled to ajury trial.
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The Court held that when a credi-
tor files a proof of claim, it initiates a
process "integral to the restructuring
of the debtor-creditor relationship
through the bankruptcy court's equi-
ty jurisdiction."' Subsequent pref-
erence actions against that creditor
are thus viewed as ancillary to that
"restructuring."
The same preference action, howev-
er, filed without the benefit of a credi-
tor's proof of claim, is "a legal action
to recover a monetary transfer." In
that case, apparently, the creditor has
ajury trial right.
This mode of analysis is hauntingly
anachronistic, harkening back to the
days of summary or plenary jurisdic-
tion based upon actual or implied
consent. One result of Langenkamp is a
schizophrenic treatment of prefer-
ence actions: the preference defen-
dant, through its decision to file a
proof of claim, now controls where
the action will be tried and who will
hear it.
And if a creditor does not receive
sound legal advice before filing its
proof of claim or taking some other
action in bankruptcy court? Jurisdic-
tion by ambush is back.4
Grogan is less problematic. The
Court there addressed a split in the
circuits over the proper quantum of
proof in fraud dischargeability cases.
Some insisted that preponderance of
the evidence governed; others re-
quired proof by clear and convincing
evidence. The Supreme Court aligned
with the former: creditors need only
prove their cases by a preponderance
of the evidence.
Grogan will have its greatest effect
on those cases in which a tenacious
creditor obtains a state court fraud
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judgment. Grogan gives that judgment
collateral estoppel (claim preclusive)
effect. Previously, debtors could lose
in state court, file bankruptcy, and
restart the litigation. The morally pli-
able took full advantage of this fact.
No more. As stated by the Court, "col-
lateral estoppel principles do indeed
apply in discharge exception proceed-
ings pursuant to § 523(a). '5 Each
debtor wishing to extend litigation
must now file his or her bankruptcy
petition before the state court enters a
final judgment.
The Court preserved, however, im-
portant distinctions between collateral
estoppel and res judicata. A state court
fraud judgment does not, of itself, bar
the debtor from contesting discharge-
ability. It only bars the debtor from
relitigating issues actually, necessarily,
and finally litigated in the state court
action. Thus, default judgments are
still suspect, as are any other actions
not accorded collateral estoppel effect
by courts in the state where the judg-
ment is issued.6
The Court also held in limbo the ef-
fect of punitive damages. In a footnote,
the Court stated that it did not consid-
er whether 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2) (A)
extends to noncompensatory damages,
although it indicated that these also
might be non-dischargeable under sec-
tion 523(a) (6), as debts caused by the
debtor's willful and malicious acts.'
The Court's next two cases involved
the murky intersection of family law
and bankruptcy. The two cases, Farrey
v. Sanderfoot and Owen v. Owen, were
both decided on the same day, and
both cases involved the same core
facts. Under property settlements in
divorces, the debtors received the
marital house. The divorce decrees,
however, encumbered each house
with a lien securing the debtor's obli-
gation to pay the other spouse sums
necessary to make the overall proper-
ty settlements equitable. Unable or
unwilling to raise the cash necessary
to satisfy these secured obligations,
the debtors filed bankruptcy, and
claimed homestead exemptions in
their houses.
In both cases, the homestead ex-
emption was affected by the ex-
spouse's judicial lien from the divorce
proceedings. Both debtors attempted
to set aside these judicial liens
through the use of section 522(f. Sec-
tion 522(f) allows a debtor to avoid
"the fixing of a [judicial] lien on an
interest of the debtor in property to
the extent that such lien impairs an
exemption to which the debtor would
have been entitled .. "
The key case is Farrey. There, the
Court held that section 522(f) could
only be used to avoid the "fixing" of a
lien which attached after the debtor
had acquired the interest. According
to the Court, grammar dictated this
result: "[t]he gerund 'fixing' refers to
a temporal event. That event-the
fastening of a liability-presupposes
an object onto which the liability can
fasten."8
Questions as to when interests are
acquired or as to when liens attach are
determined by state law. In Farrey, the
debtor gave away his case on this
point by admitting that, under Wis-
consin law (which is the same as the
Uniform Marital Property Act), the di-
vorce decree had the effect of
extinguishing all prior interests in the
marital property and creating new
ones in their places. The Court be-
lieved that the debtor's admission
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meant that, under state law, he never
possessed the house free of the judi-
cial lien. Or, using section 522(f)'s
language, the debtor never had an in-
terest in property prior to the time the
judicial lien fixed.
As Justices Kennedy and Souter
pointed out in a concurring opinion,
this reasoning allows vagaries of state
law to produce different results on the
same facts.' For example, if a debtor is
a tenant in common prior to divorce,
and the divorce decree simply transfers
the other half interest to him, there
could be an argument that the pre-ex-
isting tenancy in common was im-
paired by the judicial lien. The majori-
ty, in dicta, seems to dismiss this possi-
bility, stating that the same result would
obtain if state law did not extinguish
interests in divorces, but merely "re-
ordered them. "1 Justice Scalia declined
to join the majority opinion on this
point." Look for further litigation.
In Owen, timing was everything.
Owen owed his spouse $350,000
under a divorce decree. After the de-
cree was entered, he purchased a
condominium; under controlling
Florida law, the divorce decree creat-
ed a judicial lien on any real property
acquired. At the time of the purchase,
however, state law did not grant the
debtor a homestead exemption. State
law changed after the lien attached,
but before the debtor filed for bank-
ruptcy protection.
In bankruptcy, the debtor at-
tempted to use section 522(f) to avoid
the judicial lien on the condominium.
The non-debtor prevailed below, argu-
ing that because Florida law would not
allow the debtor to use the exemption
against her, neither should bankrupt-
cy law.
The Court began with an analysis
of section 522(0. That section allows
the avoidance of judicial liens to the
extent that such liens "impair[] an
exemption to which the debtor
would have been entitled under sub-
section (b) .... The Court then ac-
knowledged two possible readings of
the required impairment: from the
viewpoint of the debtor in a state
collection proceeding absent bank-
ruptcy, when the lack of equity in en-
cumbered property would mean
there was nothing to protect; or, from
a position in which the lien at issue
would be avoided regardless of
whether the debtor, outside of bank-
ruptcy, would have any equity in the
property. The Court adopted the lat-
ter reading.
The Court felt that the consistent
construction of section 522(d)'s ex-
emptions required this result. Those
exemptions speak to only the debtor's
interest.12 If impairment were as-
sessed as if the liens were valid against
the debtor outside of bankruptcy,
many times there would be no interest
of the debtor left. To give section
522(f) independent vitality, the Court
stated that the hypothetical language
in section 522(f) is to be read as test-
ing impairment without the lien at
issue, regardless of whether that result
would be permitted by state law.
The Court, however, could go no
further. Unlike Farrey, the debtor had
not conceded that he acquired the
property subject to the ex-spouse's in-
terest. The Court thus remanded the
matter for a determination of Florida
law on this point. 3 The Court also
suggested that the non-debtor could
raise a constitutional takings issue on
remand if, under state law, her lien at-
tached subsequently to the debtor's
acquisition of the condominium.
Farrey and Owen signal that the
Court is prepared to defer significant-
ly to secured creditors. Both are full of
language stating that the secured
creditor's "equitable" interest does
not become property of the estate,
and that, in many cases, the debtor
possesses "only bare legal title." Re-
call, however, that both cases deal with
involuntary judicial liens. Neither
would have arisen had the disgruntled
spouses obtained consensual liens
during the course of the divorce
proceedings. Against this background,
one wonders about the appropriate-
ness of this degree of deference when
the Court is asked to construe the lien
restructuring provisions of Chapters
11 and 13, or the sale free and clear
provisions of section 363(f).
The Court closed October Term
1990 with two easy cases: Johnson v.
Home State Bank and Toibb v. Radloff In
Johnson, the Court declined to con-
strue the definition of "claim" found
in 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) narrowly to halt
serial bankruptcy filings; in Toibb, the
Court declined to limit Chapter 11 to
businesses.
Johnson involved a farmer who had
filed a Chapter 7 case to discharge his
liability for a deficiency on an under-
collateralized loan. After the dis-
charge, the bank sought to foreclose
on its remaining lien. In response,
the farmer filed a Chapter 13 case.
His plan, which was confirmed, called
for four easy annual payments, with a
balloon payment of the balance at the
end of the four year plan. The bank
cried foul, and the Tenth Circuit held
in its favor, holding that the remain-
ing liability on the mortgage was not
a claim capable of a Chapter 13 re-
structure.
The Court made fast work of the
bank's claim. Both the definition of
claim and the Code's interpretive pro-
visions (section 101(2)) clearly antici-
pate that nonrecourse liability such as
that at issue is a "claim." The Court
even trotted out some impressive leg-
islative history and substantive context
to support its point. It concluded by
stating that if Congress wanted to dis-
courage serial filings, there were bet-
ter and more straightforward ways of
doing it.
In Toibb, the debtor had filed a
Chapter 7 petition. Soon thereafter,
he discovered that some stock he held
was more valuable than he had
thought. He then moved to convert
his case to a Chapter 11, and filed a
plan of reorganization. The bankrupt-
cy court never considered the plan,
dismissing the case on the grounds
that Toibb, an individual not engaged
in business, was not eligible for pro-
tection under Chapter 11. The district
court and the court of appeals af-
firmed.
The Supreme Court reversed. In an
8-1 decision by Justice Blackmun, the
Court held that nothing in section
109 excludes consumer debtors from
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eligibility under Chapter 11. Indeed,
the plain language of section 109
states that "[o]nly a person that may
be a debtor under Chapter 7... may
be a debtor under Chapter 11 ......
Because Toibb clearly qualified as a
Chapter 7 debtor, the Court had no
difficulty extending Chapter 1l's
protection to him.
The pre-decision procedural wran-
gling signalled the outcome. The
"Radloff" of the case name was
Toibb's Chapter 7 trustee; he declined
to respond at any stage of the
proceedings. The Court then asked
the office of the United States Trustee
to respond and defend the dismissal.
It also declined, stating that it be-
lieved Toibb to be right. The Court
had to take the unusual step of asking
a private lawyer to appear amicus curi-
ae to defend the judgment.
The opinion itself is sparse, and
does not cite much authority beyond
the Code and some legislative history.
The Court dismissed arguments based
upon the structure of Chapter 11 and
on the policy of not subjecting con-
sumers to involuntary proceedings
with its plain language argument.
Only Justice Stevens in dissent
thought these arguments mattered.
The Court is probably right in its
guess that Toibb will not cause a flood
of consumer Chapter 11 cases. Chap-
ter 11 is procedurally complex and
costly, making it unwieldy for all but a
few consumers. Moreover, as the
Court notes, the bankruptcy court has
sufficient discretion under section
1112(b) to act as a gatekeeper for ap-
propriate Chapter 11 candidates. With
all the other issues floating around in
the bankruptcy courts, one wonders
why this case was taken, or why it did
not result in a per curiam reversal.
The most surprising omission from
the list of cases to be heard during the
1990-91 term was Insurance Co. of Pa. v.
Ben Cooper Inc.4 At the beginning of
the term, the Court had granted certio-
rai in this case to determine the abili-
ty of a bankruptcy court to hold a jury
trial on a post-petition claim. After cer-
tiorari had been granted, the solicitor
general suggested a lack of appellate
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jurisdiction, and the Court remanded
to the Second Circuit. On remand,
that court found that jurisdiction was
present. When certiorari was requested
after remand, the Court declined to
hear the matter. This leaves a split
among the circuits as to the issue
raised.
October Term 1991
he Court's bankruptcy
docket in October Term
1991-92 was an all-time high
of nine cases. But the decisions offer
thin gruel for the bankruptcy practi-
tioner. They seem to concentrate
more on a policy of good grammar
than on good bankruptcy policy; the
reported decisions seem to require
both the Code and an English lan-
guage handbook.
Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System v. MCorp. Financial, Inc.,
dealt with the intersection of federal
banking regulations and the automat-
ic stay of section 362 of the Code. In
MCorp., a Chapter 11 bank holding
company debtor sought to enjoin the
Federal Reserve Board from prosecut-
ing administrative actions against it
under the Board's source of strength
powers. These powers grant the Board
the authority to order bank holding
companies, such as MCorp., to im-
prove the bank's financial position.
MCorp. argued that these powers did
not apply to it so long as it was pro-
tected by the automatic stay; its theory
was that there was no practical differ-
ence between the type of result sought
in the administrative proceeding and
the result of a lawsuit seeking a money
judgment. Both would require the
debtor to pay money for the benefit of
pre-petition creditors.
The Court ruled against MCorp.,
and held that the administrative
proceeding could continue. It first
noted that the Financial Institutions
Supervisory Act, applicable to the
Board's actions, contains an anti-in-
junction provision that was not specifi-
cally mentioned in section 362, the as-
sumption being that only if such cross-
reference had been made could
MCorp.'s argument have succeeded.
Next, the Court noted that section
362(b) (4) expressly exempts proceed-
ings to enforce a "governmental unit's
police or regulatory power" from the
stay. Although regulatory proceedings
are exempt, collection actions based
upon those proceedings are not. The
Court, however, noted that collection
from the debtor's estate was not at
issue, because there was not yet a final
order demanding money. "[I]f and
when the Board's proceedings culmi-
nate in a final order, and if and when
judicial proceedings are commenced
to enforce such an order, then it may
well be proper for the Bankruptcy
Court to exercise its concurrent
jurisdiction."
MCorp.'s main effect will be outside
the banking regulatory area. Govern-
ment agencies charged with protect-
ing the environment will find much in
this opinion to support their authority
to continue to conduct extensive in-
vestigations of a debtor's activities, in
spite of the automatic stay. The opin-
ion also may reinforce the investigato-
ry muscle of state and federal securi-
ties agencies. Whether this is a good
development will turn on the nature
of the regulatory scheme. The Court's
opinion is consistent with the notion
of regulate first, collect later. But what
happens if a debtor declines, due to
the press of the business of reorganiz-
ing, to participate in the agency's
action? Will it lose rights to contest
the agency's findings and conclu-
sions? The Court's opinion does not
acknowledge this factor, nor does it
note any difference between regulato-
ry investigations of post-petition con-
ditions and inquiries regarding pre-
petition behavior.
Union Bank v. Wolas presents a more
traditional bankruptcy issue. There, a
debtor had paid a loan commitment
fee and two interest payments on
long-term debt within the ninety-day
preference period of section 547 of
the Code. The trustee sought to recov-
er these payments as a preference,
and the lender defended on the basis
that the payments were protected by
section 547(c) (2), which provides a
defense for transfers made in the ordi-
nary course of business.
The trustee argued that section
54 7 (c) (2) applied only to transfers in
respect of short-term debt and trade
debt. His contention was met with deri-
sion. The Court flatly stated that "the
[statutory] text provides no support
for respondent's contention ....""
Justice Scalia added, in a separate con-
currence: "iit is regrettable that we
have a legal culture in which such argu-
ments have to be addressed.., with re-
spect to a statute utterly devoid of lan-
guage that could remotely be thought
to distinguish between long-term and
short-term debt."1'
The Court correctly left open the
question as to whether the bank had
established the elements of the prefer-
ence exception. Thus, on remand,
open questions remain as to whether
the loan was in the ordinary course of
the debtor's and the bank's business-
es, and whether the payments were
made in the ordinary course and ac-
cording to ordinary business terms.17
In short, all the Court did was to shift
the analysis to a case by case situation.
Counsel to lenders now are left with
questions to answer regarding when a
debtor can incur long-term debt in
the ordinary course of its business.
Can first-time loans ever qualify? Can
loans for new expansion? The case
may signal yet another reason that
lenders will demand full security for
any extension of credit.
Dewsnup v. Timm deals with a signifi-
cant issue by conducting a grammati-
cal and syntactical examination of sec-
tion 506 of the Code. Ms. Dewsnup
held property worth $39,000 subject
to a $120,000 mortgage. After filing
for protection under Chapter 7, she
commenced an adversary proceeding
seeking to invalidate the lien. Her
statutory basis was section 506(d),
which provides for avoiding a lien "to
the extent that [it] secures a claim
against the debtor that is not an al-
lowed secured claim."
Her argument was that under sec-
tion 506(a), the allowed secured claim
was only $39,000, and thus the balance
was disallowed, and could be "stripped"
away under section 506(d). The effect
of such a ruling would be to allow
Dewsnup to transform a recourse loan
into a non-recourse loan simply by fil-
ing bankruptcy; if successful, her per-
sonal liability for the $120,000 would
be discharged, and she could redeem
the property for $39,000.
After Union Bank, it would seem sur-
prising that the Court would construe
the same words "allowed secured
claim" differently in section 506(a)
and in section 506(d). But it did. To
reconcile the cases, the Court first
found an ambiguity in usage of the
"allowed secured claim" term, and
then adopted what it believed to be
the "better" construction. Lien strip-
ping is not permitted.
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice
Souter, did not permit the inconsis-
tencies between Dewsnup and Union
Bank to go unnoticed." In a long dis-
sent, Justice Scalia deconstructed each
of the Court's attempts to find
ambiguity. More interesting, however,
is his concluding paragraph. After
acknowledging that the Court's result
is "probably fairer from the stand-
point of natural justice," he points out
that this observation is irrelevant, be-
cause "bankruptcy law has little to do
with natural justice."19 This comment,
together with the Justice's somewhat
brittle view on statutory construction,
does not bode well for debtors'
lawyers. After all, what section of the
Code clearly states the "fresh start"
purpose, and what section grants
bankruptcy judges flexibility in
reorganizing complex businesses?
In United States v. Nordic Village, Inc.,
statutory construction achieved a new
nadir. In that case, an officer of a
debtor-in-possession dipped into es-
tate funds and paid a personal tax
obligation. When a trustee later was
appointed, he sued the government as
a transferee of an unauthorized trans-
fer under section 549 of the Code.
The government asserted sovereign
immunity.
Justice Scalia upheld the govern-
ment's position. He read section 106
of the Code as providing for a waiver
of sovereign immunity only in cases of
compulsory counterclaims and per-
missive counterclaims (capped at the
amount of the government's claim).
Section 106(c) provides that "notwith-
standing any assertion of sovereign
immunity . . . a provision of this title
that contains . . . 'entity' . . . applies to
governmental units; and . . . a
determination by the court of an issue
arising under such a provision binds
governmental units." Here, section
550 allows recovery from any "entity"
receiving a transfer voidable under
section 549.
Justice Scalia, however, invoking past
case law, found the construction cho-
sen by Congress to be ambiguous, and
not an "unequivocal expression" of
waiver. He also followed his practice of
not considering legislative history.
As a consequence, the government
may now defend any avoiding powers
action with a claim of sovereign im-
munity. Preferences, fraudulent trans-
fers, and other benefits received are
immune. The oddity here is that
Congress has never expressly adopted
sovereign immunity; it is judicially cre-
ated law, albeit with a long pedigree.
Thus, to strictly construe sovereign
immunity against a judge-made stan-
dard deprives the opinion of much of
its analytical force.
Another cipher of an opinion is
Holywell Corp. v. Smith. There, a liqui-
dating trustee of five Chapter 11
debtors (four corporations and one
individual) failed to file tax returns re-
lated to income from estate property
after confirmation of the plans. The
court painstakingly parsed the provi-
sions of the Internal Revenue Code
and found that the trustee had a duty
to file. The Court also rejected claims
that provisions of the Chapter 11 plan
which exempted the trustee from fil-
ing duties were binding on the
government because it was not a
"creditor," bound under section 1141,
as the obligations at issue in Holywell
arose post-confirmation, and "credi-
tor," as defined by section 101(10),
only applies to entities whose obliga-
tions arise pre-petition.
The Court picked up where it left
off after Dewsnup with Connecticut Nat'l
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Bank v. Germain. In Connecticut Nat'l
Bank, the bankruptcy court had re-
fused to strike a trustee's demand for
a jury trial in a removed adversary
proceeding. The creditor appealed to
the district court and lost, and then at-
tempted to appeal to the Second Cir-
cuit. For jurisdiction, the creditor re-
lied upon 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), the
general federal jurisdiction statute for
appeals from district court inter-
locutory orders, which normally ap-
plies to decisions of the district court
sitting as a trial court, not, as here, as
an appellate court.
The Second Circuit disagreed. It rea-
soned that 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) deprived
it ofjurisdiction over orders such as the
one before it. Section 158(d), enacted
with specific reference to bankruptcy
matters in 1984, does not negate
jurisdiction explicitly. With respect to
orders entered by district courts sitting
as appellate courts, however, it only
grants jurisdiction to the court of
appeals to hear final orders.
The Supreme Court disagreed with
the Second Circuit. It held that 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b) gave the courts of
appeals jurisdiction. As a result, liti-
gants have a new avenue to seek re-
view of interlocutory orders, which
type comprise most of the orders is-
sued in a bankruptcy case.
As to this holding, all justices
agreed; not one dissented. Four mem-
bers of the Court (Justices Stevens,
O'Connor, White, and Blackmun),
however, saw fit to concur on the topic
of the use of legislative history. As
noted by Justice O'Connor, the
interpretation adopted by the Court
"render[s] § 158(d) largely superflu-
ous."20 This reading, she and Justice
Stevens thought, at least obligates the
Court to explain what it is doing, and
resorting to legislative history would
be appropriate for this task.2i
The majority, however, are not be-
lievers in the utility of legislative histo-
ry. The opinion, written by Justice
Thomas, states the issue quite simply:
"[w]e have stated time and again that
courts must presume that a legisla-
ture says in a statute what it means
and means in a statute what it says
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there.... When the words of a statute
are unambiguous, then, this first
canon is also the last: 'judicial inquiry
is complete.
'
'
22
Whew. Such a statement is as striking
in its simplicity as it is broad in its appli-
cation. And such statements should
make all interpretation of the Bank-
ruptcy Code a piece of cake. Take, for
example, the pre-petition satisfaction
of an unsecured debt with a check.
What is the date of transfer? The Code,
in section 101 (54), states that a transfer
"means every mode, direct or indirect,
absolute or conditional, voluntary or
involuntary, of disposing of or parting
with property . 23 Given the breadth
of this section, doesn't a transfer occur
when a creditor delivers its check?
After all, the delivery of the check sus-
pends the creditor's right to sue on the
underlying debt until the check is dis-
honored.
2 4
The Supreme Court disagrees. In
Barnhill v. Johnson, Chief Justice
Rehnquist held that a transfer occurs,
for preference purposes, on the date
that the debtor's bank honors the
check. This decision seems at odds
with Connecticut Nat'l Bank. After all,
the definition of "transfer" does not
appear ambiguous; on the contrary, it
is incredibly expansive. The Court,
however, held that no transfer of a
property interest occurs until honor.
In addition to the debtor's order for
the bank to pay, the bank must honor
that order. This seems odd; most of us
write checks for deductible expenses
at year end, post them by December
31st, and then take deductions relat-
ing to those checks for the year in
which they were posted. As Justice
Stevens stated in dissent, the statute
speaks of "modes" of transferring
property interests, and "[a] check is
obviously a 'mode' through which the
debtor may 'par[t] with property."'2 2
Regardless, the Court has spoken.
Start calculating preference periods
from the date that the bank honors
the check.
Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz is more
consistent with Justice Thomas' analy-
sis in Connecticut Nat'l Bank. Taylor in-
volved section 522(1) of the Code,
which deals with exemption claims by
debtors. Section 522(1) requires the
debtor to file a statement of claimed
exemptions. It then provides that
"[u]nless a party in interest objects,
the property claimed as exempt on
such list is exempt." Bankruptcy Rule
4003(b) then gives parties in interest
thirty days after the first meeting of
creditors to object.
Before Taylor, some courts read sec-
tion 522(1) to include a good faith ex-
ception; creditors had unlimited time
to object if the debtor did not have a
good faith basis for the claimed ex-
emption. In Taylor, the debtor had list-
ed the full amount of any recovery in
a pending lawsuit as exempt; no more
than a minuscule amount could legiti-
mately be claimed. When the debtor
received a favorable settlement (ap-
parently somewhat unexpectedly) and
received more than enough funds to
pay all creditors in full, the trustee
sued the debtor's law firm, which had
acted as an escrow for the settlement
proceeds of the lawsuit.
The Court, again speaking through
Justice Thomas, ruled for the law
firm. Because the statute does not
mention good faith, and the trustee
did not object within the thirty days
provided by Bankruptcy Rule 4003(b),
"[s]ection 522(1), therefore, ha[d]
made the property exempt." Interest-
ingly, Justice Thomas cited absolutely
no authority for his reading of the
statute, not even Connecticut Nat'l
Bank. The fallout from the decision is
distressingly predictable: increased ac-
tivity from trustees seeking blanket ex-
tensions of Rule 4003(b)'s thirty-day
limit.
The Court closed out its term with
an examination of the murky intersec-
tion of pension law and bankruptcy.
In Patterson v. Shumate, the lower court
had ruled that an ERISA-qualified
pension did not become property of
the debtor's bankruptcy estate. It re-
lied upon section 541(c) (2), which ex-
cludes assets not generally available to
creditors under "applicable non-
bankruptcy law," such as spendthrift
trusts. Because all ERISA plans must
have the type of anti-alienation clause
the lower court found determinative,
other courts of appeals had held that
section 541 (c) (2)'s reference to appli-
cable non-bankruptcy law had to be a
reference to state law only. Thus, the
circuits were split.
The Court resolved the split by find-
ing that ERISA is "applicable non-
bankruptcy law," just as is any other
federal statute not found in Title 11.
ERISA-qualified pension plans are
thus not property of a debtor's estate,
and may not be liquidated in a
bankruptcy proceeding to pay the
debtor's debts.
The Court, in an opinion by Justice
Blackmun, used Toibb as its standard
for statutory interpretation. Although
some of section 541's legislative history
suggests that Congress intended to ex-
clude only state-law spendthrift trusts,
Justice Blackmun found that "the clari-
ty of the statutory language at issue in
this case obviate[d] the need" to con-
sult that history.26 He buttressed this
conclusion by citing Butner v. United
States"7 for the broad proposition that
"the treatment of pension benefits will
not vary based on the beneficiary's
bankruptcy status."
All nine justices agreed with this re-
sult. Justice Scalia, however, could not
help but comment on the court's
method of statutory interpretation.
After dismissing the issue in Shumate
as elementary, he noted that the
Court would not have had to decide
the case but for the Court's prior waf-
fling on the proper method of statuto-
ry interpretation. As he saw it, "the
phenomenon [of raising far-fetched
interpretations of seemingly unambig-
uous text] calls into question whether
our legal culture has so far departed
from attention to text, or is so lacking
in agreed-upon methodology for cre-
ating and interpreting text, that it any
longer makes sense to talk of a 'gov-
ernment of laws, not of men.' . . . I
trust that in our search for a neutral
and rational interpretive methodology
we have now come to rest, so that the
symbol of our profession may remain
the scales, not the see-saw.""
October Term 1992
After nine bankruptcy cases,
1 the Court took a rest in
A .1992-93. The cases it did ac-
cept, however, did have more sub-
stance. Its first opinion in October
Term 1992 was Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v.
Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. Ptnshp. At issue in
Pioneer was what conduct is "excus-
able" in filing a late proof of claim. In
the case below, the Sixth Circuit had
taken the factors listed in In re Dix29 as
non-binding guides to interpretation,
rather than as an exhaustive list of cri-
teria. A split in the circuits was thus
claimed to exist.
The petitioners in Pioneer were cred-
itors of the Chapter 11 debtor, and
some of them were on the debtor's
creditors' committee. Each of them
had apparently been assured by their
counsel not to worry about filing their
proofs of claim on time. Their coun-
sel, however, had neglected to read
fully the "Notice for Meeting of Credi-
tors," which, uncharacteristically for a
Chapter 11 case, had set forth a bar
date. The court below had found that
the debtor had suffered no prejudice
by the late filings, which were accom-
plished within three weeks of the bar
date.
The Court here focused on the ap-
parent lack of prejudice to the debtor,
or the novelty of combining a section
341 (a) notice with notice of a bar date
in a Chapter 11 case. (There is no
statutory requirement, or require-
ment in the Bankruptcy Rules, as to
when the bar date must be set in a
Chapter 11 case.) This was not accom-
plished, however, without some gram-
matical wrangling over whether "ex-
cusable neglect" was two concepts, ne-
glect and excuse, or just one.
The Court closed the 1992-1993
term with two Chapter 13 cases. Both
involved the permissible treatment of
secured creditors in Chapter 13. No-
belman v. American Savings Bank dealt
with section 1322(b)(2) of the Code.
That section takes loans "secured only
by a security interest in real property
that is the debtor's principal resi-
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dence" out of the broad modification
powers otherwise contained in section
1322. The issue was one presaged in
Dewsnup: if a loan is undersecured,
does 1322(b) (2) apply only to the se-
cured claim, as defined by section
506(b), or does it apply to the entire
loan? After the result in Dewsnup, the
Court's resolution should not seem
strange. Justice Thomas held that sec-
tion 1322(b) (2) applies to the whole
loan, regardless of how section 506(b)
might split it up for other reasons.
His reasoning on this point borders
on the novel. After reaffirming that
bankruptcy was not intended to dis-
turb property interests such as liens,
he interprets the language of section
1322(b) to apply, not to the "claims"
-which would be the province of sec-
tion 506(b)-but to the "rights" of a
secured creditor 0 As the Court put it,
section 1322(b) (2) puts the focus on
the "rights" of the holders of claims in
bankruptcy. Because "rights," as such,
are not defined in the Code, he
investigates state law to determine
what rights the secured creditor held
and, not surprisingly, found that one
such right included the ability not to
have the mortgage lien bifurcated.
The "rights" analysis is bound to
give rise to new claims by secured par-
ties. One of the purposes of sections
such as 1322 and 1129 is to modify the
rights that secured creditors have
under non-bankruptcy law. To focus
on the survival of such "rights" is
bound to lead to odd arguments
about what "modify" means, especially
if the Court is committed to not modi-
fying state law "rights."
Rake v. Wade rounds out the survey.
There, an oversecured creditor failed
to provide for post-default interest in
its documentation, providing only for
a five dollar charge for late payments.
When the debtor filed for protection
under Chapter 13 and attempted to
cure and reinstate the loan, the
lender claimed that post-petition, pre-
cure interest, as well as post-confir-
mation interest, was a component of
reinstatement. Because there was no
entitlement to such interest in the
original loan documents, the Court
had to look to bankruptcy law to fill
the gap.
The Court filled the gap with sec-
tion 506(b), which it held required
payment of interest on the arrearages.
It rejected the debtor's argument that
a "cure" eliminated a default and
placed the creditor where it would
have been under state law. "[N]othing
in [section 1322(b)(5)] dictates the
terms of the cure." Because payment
of interest could be part of a cure, and
because the Court was loathe to ig-
nore Section 506(b), it required the
payment of interest.
Part of the weakness of Rake is that
it leaves open the issue as to what is
the effective rate of interest; at least if
an effective rate was provided by state
law, there would be some certainty. Al-
most immediately after the Rake opin-
ion was issued, Congress amended the
pending bankruptcy reform legisla-
tion to overrule Rake.3" Until such leg-
islation is passed, however, the pay-
ment of interest will be part of any
Chapter 13 cure and reinstatement.
Possible Explanations
I would like to explain that the
Court increased its bankruptcy
docket because it has realized
the importance of a sound, consistent
bankruptcy law to the nation's econo-
my, or that it found that the consider-
ation of bankruptcy issues presented a
unique blend of intellectual rigor,
pragmatism, and policy. However, I
cannot and remain honest. Rather
than eighteen pieces of a single puz-
zle, the Court's bankruptcy cases from
1990 to 1993 appear more like eigh-
teen separate puzzles.
Still, can one engage in a mild, but
constructive, cynicism and cull some
transcendent similarities? Perhaps
these cases are testing grounds for
other, presumably more important or
interesting statutes. They may simply
be the latest vehicles in the Court's
continuing effort to apply "plain mean-
ing" to the interpretation of federal
statutes. Alternatively, these cases with
so little of substance in common may
reflect no more than the products of
circuit splits natural with respect to a
pervasive federal code entering the sec-
ond decade of its existence. I opt for a
mild, and not very informative, version
of the last explanation.
Conspiracy
One could examine the eighteen
cases and wonder: how could the
Court decide so many bankruptcy
cases in a three-year period without
developing more of an interrelation-
ship among them? Rarely do any of
the eighteen decisions cite one anoth-
er, and, even then, citation usually is
only to the last case decided. Yet the
statutory construction message is rela-
tively clear: plain meaning, whatever
that may be, is the preferred method
of construction for the Bankruptcy
Code.
One is tempted to expand that last
statement. Plain meaning is the
method of construction for all federal
statutes. But, why do such intense and
dogmatic discussions of plain mean-
ing occur in bankruptcy cases?
I offer the following for conspiracy
buffs. The Court is using bankruptcy
cases to build an impressive (at least
in numbers) body of precedent to
apply to some tough statutory cases it
knows are coming, such as the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act, the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, or even President
Clinton's federal health care plan.
The dark side of this theory is that the
justices do not like such statutes, pre-
ferring Jefferson's agrarian and indi-
vidualistic vision of the relationship
between Congress and the people it
governs. Anyone who has glanced at
the text of these recent examples of
social legislation can only cringe at
the prospect of applying the literalism
of, say, Connecticut National Bank v. Ger-
main to such statutes. In short, the
Court is sacrificing a coherent bank-
ruptcy policy to thwart expansive in-
terpretation of congressional efforts
in the social policy arena.
As with most conspiracy theories,
however, this one collapses of its own
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weight. Dewsnup v. Timm, Barnhill v.
Johnson, and Pioneer Services, at least,
present gaps in the monolithic vision
required by this theory. 3 1 More impor-
tantly, the collective animus necessary
for this theory is likely not present. My
perhaps naive belief in the essential
decency of the justices precludes any
notion that the justices consistently
and pervasively utilize this kind of ten-
dentious approach to the cases before
them. Also, the lack of citation in non-
bankruptcy cases to the analysis con-
tained in the eighteen cases reviewed
above tends to rule out an active cam-
paign for their advancement as the
new vanguard of statutory construc-
tion.
Literalism
So why the continued recitation of
plain meaning? Perhaps it is because
many of the justices sincerely believe
in it. The affirmative case for such lit-
eralism is that, in our system of gov-
ernment, Congress legislates and the
Court merely interprets. Unlike feder-
al agencies such as the Environmental
Protection Agency or the Federal Re-
serve Board, courts do not exist to fill
in gaps in legislation consistent with
an overall congressional purpose. And
the lack of any such agency to admin-
ister the Bankruptcy Code has forced
the issue in bankruptcy in ways which
would not exist in other areas of fed-
eral legislation.
In short, under this view, a sincere
belief in separation of powers meets
one of the few pervasive and contro-
versial federal statutes which goes di-
rectly from Congress to the courts
without any intermediate interpreta-
tion. Tax statutes, by contrast, are just
as (or more) complex, but they are
mediated by IRS regulations which af-
fect their construction, and, more im-
portantly, the process for litigating
their interpretation in ways not ex-
perienced in bankruptcy. A similar
mediation occurs with environmental
and banking statutes. In bankruptcy,
however, the Court is often presented
with cases of arguably ambiguous
statutory text (likely the product of
congressional compromise), and the
only guides as to its meaning are the
decisions of the courts below. Missing
is interpretation by an entity whose
purpose is to interpret a federal code
consistently.
This is the most benign statement
of this proposition that I can muster.
Noting a lack of a leavening force may
be an explanation of the fractured na-
ture of the eighteen cases, but it is not
a justification. After all, the common
law studied in the first year of law
school is probably a better example of
the attempt to weave a consistent body
of law of general applicability without
the benefit of a federal agency's inter-
pretation. And some courts manage to
get that right.
This theory then gets turned on it-
self. Failure to interpret the Bankrup-
tcy Code consistently then becomes
an abdication of'judicial responsibility,
not a vindication of it. But even this is
an overstatement. As Robert Ras-
mussen has noted recently, the
Court's plain meaning approach has
not affected the outcome of many of
the decided cases.3 For the most part,
the Court's decisions definitively settle
some common issues. After Barnhill,
for example, there should not be
much question as to when a check
constitutes a transfer; after Dewsnup,
there can be little doubt that lien
stripdown is not available.
But, as of yet, this piecemeal re-
sponse to the question of the moment
has left many of us unsatisfied that the
Court is doing right by the Bankruptcy
Code. We long for the days of (dare I
say it) Justice William 0. Douglas, who
actively participated in shaping the
contours of the Chandler Act of 1938
(Case v. Los Angeles Lumberwas his third
written opinion) and bankruptcy poli-
cy thereafter. It is safe to say that no
one fills his shoes now.
Ennui
This leads me to my final and pedes-
trian point. Perhaps the best expla-
nation of the eighteen cases is simply
that, one decade after its enactment,
the Bankruptcy Code has matured to a
point where many of its terms are now
the subject of disparate treatment at
the circuit level. Enough cases have
arisen and been appealed that only
now are we seeing significant splits
among the circuits on various interpre-
tations of the Bankruptcy Code. And
because the Court does view one of its
functions as correcting such circuit
splits, these cases naturally present
themselves to the Court, and to its
clerks, as likely candidates for certiorari.
How else to explain cases like Toibb,
in which the Court had to appoint
counsel for one of the parties? Or
Union Bank, in which Justice Scalia ex-
coriates counsel and some courts as
follows: "[i]t is regrettable that we
have a legal culture in which such ar-
guments have to be addressed (and
are indeed credited by a Court of Ap-
peals), with respect to a statute utterly
devoid of language that could remote-
ly be thought to distinguish between
long-term and short-term debt. Be-
cause there was here no contention of
a 'scrivener's error' producing an ab-
surd result, the plain text of the
statute should have made this litiga-
tion unnecessary and unmaintain-
able."34 Or the high number of 9-0, or
8-1 opinions?
Another facet of this explanation
may be the role of Justice Thomas.
After he was appointed, he authored
five of the nine subsequent bankrupt-
cy decisions. I do not think the reason
for this is that he is a bankruptcy buff.
Rather, the Court's practice of allow-
ing the senior justice in the majority
(or the chief justice if he is in the ma-
jority) to assign the opinion may ac-
count for it. It is not a fanciful view to
envision a conference in which all
eyes turn to Justice Thomas, the new
guy, to resolve a circuit split over what
must appear to the rest as a relatively
arcane bankruptcy point. Watch to see
if Justice Ginsburg writes the next
wave of bankruptcy opinions.
Of course, those of us who focus
upon the Bankruptcy Code as part of
our daily work rightly wince at this
prospect. But the Bankruptcy Code is
resilient, and it will take more than a
motley collection of interpretations to
deprive it of its place in commercial
law. We can at least count our bless-
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ings that the Court, for whatever rea-
son, has avoided subjecting significant
bankruptcy issues to analysis over this
period. The Court has not spoken
definitively on jury trial rights,"5 on
the proper scope of the absolute
priority rule,36 or on a host of other is-
sues central to the smooth and effi-
cient operation of the bankruptcy sys-
tem. Maybe that is why these cases are
so unsatisfying: the Court has not
been pressed by the issues presented
to consider the whole.
So, I end as I began, without any
sure-fire, snappy explanation orjustifi-
cation linking the eighteen bank-
ruptcy cases decided during October
Terms 1990-1993. I think we will con-
tinue to see bankruptcy cases decided
at a higher rate than the historic one
or two cases a year, but certainly at a
lesser rate than recently. Moreover, I
think that the happenstance of a cir-
cuit conflict will be the most salient
explanation for the grant of certiorari.
Beyond that, one can only speculate.
ENDNOTES
'The following table sets forth the
basic statistics. The numbers are taken
from the Harvard Law Review's annual
review of the Supreme Court. For the
total number of "opinions written," I
have used the number of cases which
appear under the Method of Disposition
column, currently found in Table Ii of
the annual review. As to the categorizat-
ion of a case as a "bankr. opinion," I
have relied upon Table III of the annual
review, and have supplemented that
table when appropriate.
Opinions
Year Written
OT 1992 119
OT 1991 127
OT 1990 129
3-YEAR AVG.
OT 1989 151
OT 1988 170
OT 1987 167
OT 1986 175
OT 1985 172
OT 1984 175
OT 1983 184
OT 1982 182
OT 1981 216
OT 1980 159
10-YEAR AVG.
Bankr.
Opinions
3
9
6
2
2
2
2
1
2
3
0
Percent
2.52%
7.09%
4.65%
4.75%
1.32%
1.18%
1.20%
0.57%
0.58%
1.14%
0.54%
1.10%
1.39%
0.00%
1.02%
2 The eighteen cases are as follows,
with a short description of its holding
following each:
October Term 1990
" Langenkamp v. Culp, 498 U.S. 42
(1990) (per curiam). Filing a proof of
claim constitutes a waiver of jury trial
rights for preference actions
" Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279
(1991). Dischargeability determined
by preponderance of evidence stan-
dard; collateral estoppel applies to
state court findings on relevant issues
" Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 111 S. Ct. 1825
(1991). Husband may not use Section
522(f) to avoid lien on former marital
residence imposed by court in divorce
proceedings if those proceedings re-
structured ownership interests so that
spouse's lien was created at the same
time as debtor's interest
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" Owen v. Owen, 111 S. Ct. 1833 (1991).
Husband may not retroactively take
advantage of revision of state home-
stead exemption
" Johnson v. Home State Bank, 111 S.
Ct. 2150 (1991). Debtor may file
Chapter 13 case to reorganize home
mortgage payments after discharging
personal liability in Chapter 7 case
* Toibb v. Radloff, 111 S. Ct. 2197
(1991). Individuals may file Chapter
11 even if not engaged in business
October Term 1991
" Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System v. MCorp. Financial, Inc.,
112 S. Ct. 459 (1991). Automatic stay
in bankruptcy does not affect Federal
Reserve's ability to force contributions
of capital to bank subsidiaries under
Fed's source of strength powers
" Union Bank v. Wolas, 112 S. Ct. 527
(1991). Payments on long-term debt
may qualify as being made in the ordi-
nary course of business for purposes
of exception to preference law
* Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773
(1992). Chapter 7 debtor may not
"strip down" undersecured mortgage,
discharge deficiency, and redeem
property secured at market value
" United States v. Nordic Village, Inc.,
112 S. Ct. 1011 (1992). United States
Government, as recipient of prefer-
ence payment of corporate insider's
tax payment, has sovereign immunity
" Holywell Corp. v. Smith, 112 S. Ct.
1021 (1992). Liquidating trustee of
Chapter 11 concern must file fiducia-
ry tax returns
" Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain,
112 S. Ct. 1146 (1992). Special juris-
dictional statutes. for bankruptcy ap-
peals do not affect other avenues of
appeal from district courts
* Barnhill v. Johnson, 112 S. Ct. 1386
(1992). For purposes of preferences,
transfer is made when check honored,
not when delivered
* Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 112 S. Ct.
1644 (1992). Trustee in bankruptcy
must object to debtor's claimed ex-
emptions within thirty-day period; no
exception for exemptions taken in
bad faith or without any statutory justi-
fication
* Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242
(1992). ERISA-qualified pension plan
exempt from bankruptcy court distri-
bution
October Term 1992
" Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick
Assoc. Ltd. Ptnshp., 113 S. Ct 1489
(1993). Excusable neglect in filing a
proof of claim is subject to a balancing
test which includes the good faith of
the parties
* Nobelman v. American Savings Bank,
113 S. Ct. 2106 (1993). Chapter 13
plan may not affect the rights of a
holder of a mortgage secured solely by
the debtor's primary residence even if
value of home is less than obligations
secured by home
" Rake v. Wade, 113 S. Ct. 2187 (1993).
Chapter 13 debtor must include post-
petition interest, even if not required
by applicable non-bankruptcy law, in
any effort to cure defaulted mortgage
3498 U.S. at 44.
4The Court's focus on the filing of a
proof of claim seems formalistic and
potentially mischievous. The Code pre-
sumes filing in some circumstances (sec-
tion 1111 (a)), permits the debtor to file
a claim for any creditor in others
(Bankr. R. 3004), and has been inter-
preted loosely with respect to informal
proofs of claim. Will the Court treat any
of these circumstances as the filing of a
proof of claim within Langenkamp? If
Langenkamp's requirement of filing is
taken at face value, rather than as evi-
dence of implied consent, they might.
'498 U.S. at 284 n.l1.
6See28 U.S.C. § 1738.
7498 U.S. at 282 n.2.
8111 S. Ct. at 1829.
911 S. Ct. at 1832.
'0111 S. Ct. at 1831.
11111 S. Ct. at 1831 n.4.12See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (1)-(6); (8).13Not surprisingly, the lower courts
found that the debtor did not have an
interest in the property, as the majority
defined it, and ruled for the non-debtor.
Owen v. Owen, 961 F.2d 170, 172 (lth
Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 659 (1992).
14896 F.2d 1394 (2d Cir.), cert. granted,
110 S. Ct. 3269, cert. vacated and remand-
ed, 111 S. Ct. 425 (1990), opinion reinstat-
ed on remand, 924 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 2041 (1991).
15112 S. Ct. at 530.
161d. at 534.171d. at 533-34.
l"Judge Jones, of the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, believes that Dewsnup
has "clouded" statutory construction in
bankruptcy. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins.
Co. vs. Greystone III Joint Venture (In re
Greystone III Joint Venture), 995 F.2d
1274, 1285 (5th Cir. 1992) (Jones, J., dis-
senting from grant of rehearing). In
one of the more literate defenses of
plain meaning, she echoed Galileo's
words when asked to affirm church doc-
trine that the sun revolves around the
Earth: "eppur si muove" ("And yet it
moves"). Id. Time will tell whether, as
Judge Jones apparently believes, the
context revolves around a statute, or
whether the statute is the satellite con-
trolled by context.
19112 S. Ct. at 787.20112 S. Ct. at 1151.
21Id. at 1150 (Stevens,J., concurring).22112 S. Ct. 1149.
23Note: the statutory reference is to
the second section 101(54); Congress
hasn't gotten its act sufficiently together
to iron out all the duplicated section
designations.24See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-
802(1) (b); Revised § 3-310(b).25112 S. Ct. at 1392.
261112 S. Ct. at 2249.
27440 U.S. 48 (1978).
281d. at 2250-51.
2995 B.R. 134 (9th Cir. BAP 1988).
30The Court also attempted to show
that its result was consistent with a
claims analysis.
Congress chose to use the phrase
"claim secured . . . by" in §
1322(b)(2)'s exception, rather
than repeating the term of art "se-
cured claim." The unqualified
word "claim" is broadly defined
under the Code to encompass any
"right to payment, whether ... se-
cure [d] or unsecured" or any
"right to an equitable remedy for
breach of performance if such
breach gives rise to a right to pay-
ment, whether ... secure[d] or
unsecured."ll U.S.C. § 101(5)
(1988 ed., Supp. III). It is also
plausible, therefore, to read "a
claim secured only by a [home-
stead lien]" as referring to the
lienholder's entire claim, includ-
ing both the secured and the un-
secured components of the claim.
113 S. Ct. at 2111.
31S. 540, 103d Cong., 1st. Sess., §
310(c) (1993) (Oct. 28, 1993). See also
S. REP. No. 168, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 53
(1993).3 2The Court's waffling on Ben Cooper is
further evidence of an inability to agree
on a unified approach.33Robert K. Rasmussen, A Study of the
Costs and Benefits of Textualism: The
Supreme Court's Bankruptcy Cases, 71
WASH. U.L.Q. 535 (1993).
31 Union Bank, 112 S. Ct. at 112.
35 Indeed, it affirmatively avoided the
issue in Ben Cooper.
" As this article was going to press, the
court granted certiorari in Bonner Mall
Partnership v. U.S. Bancorp Mortgage
Co. (In re Bonner Mall Partnership), 2
F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 66
U.S.L.W. 3451 (Jan. 10, 1994) (No. 93-
714). Bonner Mall presents the issue of
the viability of the new value excep-
tion/corollary to the absolute priority
rule, an issue the court ducked the last
time it was presented. Norwest Bank
Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 203
n.3 (1988). It also presents an issue of
appellate jurisdiction, being a denial of
relief from stay and, thus, might allow
the court to avoid the issue again.
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